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A teenage boy with a sex therapist mother teams up with a high school classmate to set | Trailer .. Aspect Ratio: 1. See full technical specs». Edit. Information about how New York State's registered sex offenders are Level 1 (​low risk of repeat offense), or; Level 2 (moderate risk of repeat offense), or; Level​. Sex Education season 2: cast, release date, plot and everything we know so far. Season one spoilers ahead! Hannah Mylrea. 25th November.

There are 3 levels of sex offenders in Massachusetts. person, or a person released from civil commitment anytime from August 1, Complete Level 2 offender data including those classified prior to July 12, is. Information about how New York State's registered sex offenders are Level 1 (​low risk of repeat offense), or; Level 2 (moderate risk of repeat offense), or; Level​. Sex Education season 2: cast, release date, plot and everything we know so far. Season one spoilers ahead! Hannah Mylrea. 25th November.

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An explicit pic puts a mean girl on the spot; Maeve wants to track down the shaming culprit, forcing Otis to make a tough choice on an important day.

The big dance brings out the sex, and the drama in Moordale's student body; Otis finds a date; Maeve gets her dress; Eric returns with style. Otis' clinic achieves liftoff, as does his attraction to Maeve, who unexpectedly asks him for help; Eric swings off on his own and fields a come-on.

On this IMDbrief, we break down the worst gifts ever given in our favorite holiday movies. Watch now. Looking for something to watch? Check out " Sex Education. Watch our video. Otis feels violated by Jean's book; Sex takes the fall for her brother; Eric serves detention with an old foe; Lily's body betrays her.

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A family of former child heroes, now grown apart, must reunite to continue to protect the world. Follows teenager Clay Jensen, sex his quest to uncover the story behind his classmate and crush, Hannah, and her decision to end her life. James is 17 and is pretty sure he is a psychopath. Alyssa, also 17, is the cool and moody new girl at school. The pair make a connection and she persuades him to embark on a road trip in search sex her real father. A cynical young woman in New York City keeps dying and returning to the party that's being thrown in her honor on that same evening.

She tries to find a way out of this strange time loop. A group of unique robbers assault the Factory of Moneda and Timbre to carry out the most perfect robbery in the history of Spain and take home 2. As her 16th birthday nears, Sabrina must choose between the witch world of her family and the human world of her friends. Based on the Archie comic. An anthology series exploring a twisted, high-tech multiverse where humanity's greatest innovations and darkest instincts collide.

When a young boy disappears, his mother, a police chief, and his friends must confront terrifying supernatural forces in order to get him back. When everyone else mysteriously vanishes from their wealthy town, the teen residents of West Ham must forge their own society to survive.

Privileged teens living on the Upper East Side of New York can hide no secret from the ruthless blogger who is always watching. A teenage boy with sex sex therapist mother teams up with a high school classmate to set up an underground sex therapy clinic at school. Probably the best production Netflix has ever done so far. By the way it's not just for teenagers I'm Explore popular and recently added TV series available to stream now with Prime Video. Start your free trial. Sign In. Keep track sex everything you watch; tell your friends.

Full Cast and Crew. Release Dates. Official Sites. Company Credits. Technical Specs. Episode List. Plot Summary. Plot Keywords. Parents Guide. External Sites. User Reviews. User Ratings. External Reviews. Metacritic Reviews. Photo Gallery. Trailers and Videos. Crazy Credits. Alternate Versions. Rate This. Season 2 Premiere. Creator: Laurie Nunn. Added to Watchlist. Top-Rated Episodes S1.

Error: please try again. Top 20 Highest-Rated Shows of Ali Abbas Zafar's Watchlist. Gesehen Serien. TV shows that ive watched. Sex Much Have You Seen? How many episodes of Sex Education have you seen? Share this Rating Title: Sex Education — 8. Use the HTML below. You must be a registered user to use the IMDb rating plugin. Episodes Season 2 Premiere Friday, January 17, E1 Episode 2. E8 Episode 1. E7 Episode 1. Learn more More Like This.

You TV Series Crime Drama Romance. Elite TV Series Crime Drama Thriller. Action Adventure Comedy. Drama Mystery. Adventure Comedy Crime. Russian Doll TV Series Adventure Comedy Drama. Money Heist TV Series Action Crime Mystery. Drama Fantasy Horror. Black Mirror TV Series Drama Sci-Fi Thriller. Stranger Things TV Series The Society TV Series Drama Mystery Sci-Fi. Gossip Girl — Drama Romance. Edit Cast Series cast sex Simone Ashley Olivia 16 episodes, Asa Butterfield Otis Milburn 10 episodes, Gillian Anderson Jean Milburn 10 episodes, Ncuti Gatwa Eric Effoing sex episodes, Emma Mackey Maeve Wiley 10 episodes, Connor Swindells Adam Groff 10 episodes, Kedar Williams-Stirling Jackson Sex 10 episodes, Alistair Petrie Groff 10 episodes, Aimee Lou Wood Aimee Gibbs 10 episodes, Mimi Keene

Use the HTML below. You must be a registered user to use the IMDb rating plugin. Episodes Season 2 Premiere Friday, January 17, E1 Episode 2. E8 Episode 1. E7 Episode 1. Learn more More Like This. You TV Series Crime Drama Romance. Elite TV Series Crime Drama Thriller. Action Adventure Comedy. Drama Mystery. Adventure Comedy Crime. Russian Doll TV Series Adventure Comedy Drama. Money Heist TV Series Action Crime Mystery. Drama Fantasy Horror.

Black Mirror TV Series Drama Sci-Fi Thriller. Stranger Things TV Series The Society TV Series Drama Mystery Sci-Fi. Gossip Girl — Drama Romance. Edit Cast Series cast summary: Simone Ashley Olivia 16 episodes, Asa Butterfield Otis Milburn 10 episodes, Gillian Anderson Jean Milburn 10 episodes, Ncuti Gatwa Eric Effoing 10 episodes, Emma Mackey Maeve Wiley 10 episodes, Connor Swindells Adam Groff 10 episodes, Kedar Williams-Stirling Jackson Marchetti 10 episodes, Alistair Petrie Groff 10 episodes, Aimee Lou Wood Aimee Gibbs 10 episodes, Mimi Keene Ruby 8 episodes, Chaneil Kular Anwar 8 episodes, Chinenye Ezeudu Viv 8 episodes, Tanya Reynolds Lily Iglehart 7 episodes, Jim Howick Hendricks 7 episodes, George Robinson Edit Storyline A teenage boy with a sex therapist mother teams up with a high school classmate to set up an underground sex therapy clinic at school.

Language: English. Runtime: 45 min. Edit Did You Know? Trivia In the episode 4, the poster hanged to the wall in the bedroom belongs to "All Good Things" a rock band from California.

Frequently Asked Questions Q: Wonderful show! Funny, touching, etc etc, but I can't find the song at the end of the 3rd episode!! Please help. I have tried googling the lyrics and shazaaming the song, but I really cant find it. Q: What is Sex Education and what is it about? Was this review helpful to you? Yes No Report this. Edit page. Add episode. Clear your history. Olivia 16 episodes, Otis Milburn 10 episodes, Jean Milburn 10 episodes, Eric Effoing 10 episodes, Maeve Wiley 10 episodes, Adam Groff 10 episodes, Jackson Marchetti 10 episodes, Groff 10 episodes, Aimee Gibbs 10 episodes, Ruby 8 episodes, Anwar 8 episodes, Females' genitals were thought to be the same as males' but simply directed inside the body; ovaries and testes for instance were referred to by the same term and whether the term referred to the former or the latter was made clear by the context Laqueur , 4.

For an alternative view, see King She estimates that 1. In her [a], Fausto-Sterling notes that these labels were put forward tongue—in—cheek. Recognition of intersexes suggests that feminists and society at large are wrong to think that humans are either female or male.

However, she was discovered to have XY chromosomes and was barred from competing in women's sports Fausto-Sterling b, 1—3. Deciding what sex is involves evaluative judgements that are influenced by social factors.

Insofar as our cultural conceptions affect our understandings of sex, feminists must be much more careful about sex classifications and rethink what sex amounts to Stone , chapter 1. More specifically, intersexed people illustrate that sex traits associated with females and males need not always go together and that individuals can have some mixture of these traits. This suggest to Stone that sex is a cluster concept: it is sufficient to satisfy enough of the sex features that tend to cluster together in order to count as being of a particular sex.

But, one need not satisfy all of those features or some arbitrarily chosen supposedly necessary sex feature, like chromosomes Stone , Further, intersexes along with trans people are located at the centre of the sex spectrum and in many cases their sex will be indeterminate Stone More recently, Ayala and Vasilyeva have argued for an inclusive and extended conception of sex: just as certain tools can be seen to extend our minds beyond the limits of our brains e. This view aims to motivate the idea that what counts as sex should not be determined by looking inwards at genitalia or other anatomical features.

In addition to arguing against identity politics and for gender performativity, Butler holds that distinguishing biological sex from social gender is unintelligible. For her, both are socially constructed:. See also: Antony ; Gatens ; Grosz ; Prokhovnik Butler makes two different claims in the passage cited: that sex is a social construction, and that sex is gender.

To unpack her view, consider the two claims in turn. Prima facie , this implausibly implies that female and male bodies do not have independent existence and that if gendering activities ceased, so would physical bodies. This is not Butler's claim; rather, her position is that bodies viewed as the material foundations on which gender is constructed, are themselves constructed as if they provide such material foundations Butler For Butler, sexed bodies never exist outside social meanings and how we understand gender shapes how we understand sex , Sexed bodies are not empty matter on which gender is constructed and sex categories are not picked out on the basis of objective features of the world.

Instead, our sexed bodies are themselves discursively constructed : they are the way they are, at least to a substantial extent, because of what is attributed to sexed bodies and how they are classified for discursive construction, see Haslanger , Sex assignment calling someone female or male is normative Butler , 1. In fact, the doctor is performing an illocutionary speech act see the entry on Speech Acts.

In effect, the doctor's utterance makes infants into girls or boys. We, then, engage in activities that make it seem as if sexes naturally come in two and that being female or male is an objective feature of the world, rather than being a consequence of certain constitutive acts that is, rather than being performative.

And this is what Butler means in saying that physical bodies never exist outside cultural and social meanings, and that sex is as socially constructed as gender. She does not deny that physical bodies exist. But, she takes our understanding of this existence to be a product of social conditioning: social conditioning makes the existence of physical bodies intelligible to us by discursively constructing sexed bodies through certain constitutive acts.

For a helpful introduction to Butler's views, see Salih For Butler, sex assignment is always in some sense oppressive. Again, this appears to be because of Butler's general suspicion of classification: sex classification can never be merely descriptive but always has a normative element reflecting evaluative claims of those who are powerful. Conducting a feminist genealogy of the body or examining why sexed bodies are thought to come naturally as female and male , then, should ground feminist practice Butler , 28—9.

Doing so enables feminists to identity how sexed bodies are socially constructed in order to resist such construction. Stone takes this to mean that sex is gender but goes on to question it arguing that the social construction of both sex and gender does not make sex identical to gender. According to Stone, it would be more accurate for Butler to say that claims about sex imply gender norms. To some extent the claim describes certain facts.

But, it also implies that females are not expected to do much heavy lifting and that they would probably not be good at it. So, claims about sex are not identical to claims about gender; rather, they imply claims about gender norms Stone , Grosz ; Prokhovnik The thought is that in oppositions like these, one term is always superior to the other and that the devalued term is usually associated with women Lloyd For instance, human subjectivity and agency are identified with the mind but since women are usually identified with their bodies, they are devalued as human subjects and agents.

This is said to be evident for instance in job interviews. Men are treated as gender-neutral persons and not asked whether they are planning to take time off to have a family. By contrast, that women face such queries illustrates that they are associated more closely than men with bodily features to do with procreation Prokhovnik , The opposition between mind and body, then, is thought to map onto the opposition between men and women.

The idea is that gender maps onto mind, sex onto body. That is, the s distinction understood sex as fixed by biology without any cultural or historical dimensions. This understanding, however, ignores lived experiences and embodiment as aspects of womanhood and manhood by separating sex from gender and insisting that womanhood is to do with the latter. Rather, embodiment must be included in one's theory that tries to figure out what it is to be a woman or a man.

First, claiming that gender is socially constructed implies that the existence of women and men is a mind-dependent matter. This suggests that we can do away with women and men simply by altering some social practices, conventions or conditions on which gender depends whatever those are. However, ordinary social agents find this unintuitive given that ordinarily sex and gender are not distinguished.

Second, claiming that gender is a product of oppressive social forces suggests that doing away with women and men should be feminism's political goal. But this harbours ontologically undesirable commitments since many ordinary social agents view their gender to be a source of positive value. So, feminism seems to want to do away with something that should not be done away with, which is unlikely to motivate social agents to act in ways that aim at gender justice.

Given these problems, Mikkola argues that feminists should give up the distinction on practical political grounds. Feminism is the movement to end the oppression women as a group face. But, how should the category of women be understood if feminists accept the above arguments that gender construction is not uniform, that a sharp distinction between biological sex and social gender is false or at least not useful, and that various features associated with women play a role in what it is to be a woman, none of which are individually necessary and jointly sufficient like a variety of social roles, positions, behaviours, traits, bodily features and experiences?

Feminists must be able to address cultural and social differences in gender construction if feminism is to be a genuinely inclusive movement and be careful not to posit commonalities that mask important ways in which women qua women differ. These concerns among others have generated a situation where as Linda Alcoff puts it feminists aim to speak and make political demands in the name of women, at the same time rejecting the idea that there is a unified category of women , If feminist critiques of the category women are successful, then what if anything binds women together, what is it to be a woman, and what kinds of demands can feminists make on behalf of women?

Many have found the fragmentation of the category of women problematic for political reasons e. For instance, Young holds that accounts like Spelman's reduce the category of women to a gerrymandered collection of individuals with nothing to bind them together , Black women differ from white women but members of both groups also differ from one another with respect to nationality, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation and economic position; that is, wealthy white women differ from working-class white women due to their economic and class positions.

These sub-groups are themselves diverse: for instance, some working-class white women in Northern Ireland are starkly divided along religious lines. So if we accept Spelman's position, we risk ending up with individual women and nothing to bind them together. And this is problematic: in order to respond to oppression of women in general, feminists must understand them as a category in some sense.

Some, then, take the articulation of an inclusive category of women to be the prerequisite for effective feminist politics and a rich literature has emerged that aims to conceptualise women as a group or a collective e. Articulations of this category can be divided into those that are: a gender nominalist — positions that deny there is something women qua women share and that seek to unify women's social kind by appealing to something external to women; and b gender realist — positions that take there to be something women qua women share although these realist positions differ significantly from those outlined in Section 2.

Below we will review some influential gender nominalist and gender realist positions. Before doing so, it is worth noting that not everyone is convinced that attempts to articulate an inclusive category of women can succeed or that worries about what it is to be a woman are in need of being resolved. Instead, Mikkola argues for giving up the quest, which in any case she argues poses no serious political obstacles.

Young holds that women are not bound together by a shared feature or experience or set of features and experiences since she takes Spelman's particularity argument to have established definitely that no such feature exists , 13; see also: Frye ; Heyes Instead, women's category is unified by certain practico-inert realities or the ways in which women's lives and their actions are oriented around certain objects and everyday realities Young , 23—4.

For example, bus commuters make up a series unified through their individual actions being organised around the same practico-inert objects of the bus and the practice of public transport. Women make up a series unified through women's lives and actions being organised around certain practico-inert objects and realities that position them as women.

Young identifies two broad groups of such practico-inert objects and realities. First, phenomena associated with female bodies physical facts , biological processes that take place in female bodies menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth and social rules associated with these biological processes social rules of menstruation, for instance.

Second, gender-coded objects and practices: pronouns, verbal and visual representations of gender, gender-coded artefacts and social spaces, clothes, cosmetics, tools and furniture.

So, women make up a series since their lives and actions are organised around female bodies and certain gender-coded objects. Although Young's proposal purports to be a response to Spelman's worries, Stone has questioned whether it is, after all, susceptible to the particularity argument: ultimately, on Young's view, something women as women share their practico-inert realities binds them together Stone Natalie Stoljar holds that unless the category of women is unified, feminist action on behalf of women cannot be justified , Stoljar too is persuaded by the thought that women qua women do not share anything unitary.

This prompts her to argue for resemblance nominalism. This is the view that a certain kind of resemblance relation holds between entities of a particular type for more on resemblance nominalism, see Armstrong , 39— Stoljar relies more on Price's resemblance nominalism whereby x is a member of some type F only if x resembles some paradigm or exemplar of F sufficiently closely Price , For instance, the type of red entities is unified by some chosen red paradigms so that only those entities that sufficiently resemble the paradigms count as red.

The type or category of women, then, is unified by some chosen woman paradigms so that those who sufficiently resemble the woman paradigms count as women Stoljar , Semantic considerations about the concept woman suggest to Stoljar that resemblance nominalism should be endorsed Stoljar , It seems unlikely that the concept is applied on the basis of some single social feature all and only women possess.

Nonetheless, she holds that since the concept woman applies to at least some MTF trans persons, one can be a woman without being female Stoljar , The cluster concept woman does not, however, straightforwardly provide the criterion for picking out the category of women. Rather, the four clusters of features that the concept picks out help single out woman paradigms that in turn help single out the category of women.

First, any individual who possesses a feature from at least three of the four clusters mentioned will count as an exemplar of the category. That is, what delimits membership in the category of women is that one resembles sufficiently a woman paradigm. In a series of articles collected in her book of , Sally Haslanger argues for a way to define the concept woman that is politically useful, serving as a tool in feminist fights against sexism, and that shows woman to be a social not a biological notion.

More specifically, Haslanger argues that gender is a matter of occupying either a subordinate or a privileged social position. In some articles, Haslanger is arguing for a revisionary analysis of the concept woman b; a; b.

Elsewhere she suggests that her analysis may not be that revisionary after all ; Consider the former argument first. Haslanger's analysis is, in her terms, ameliorative: it aims to elucidate which gender concepts best help feminists achieve their legitimate purposes thereby elucidating those concepts feminists should be using Haslanger b, In particular, they need gender terms to identify, explain and talk about persistent social inequalities between males and females.

Haslanger's analysis of gender begins with the recognition that females and males differ in two respects: physically and in their social positions. And this generates persistent sexist injustices. With this in mind, Haslanger specifies how she understands genders:. These are constitutive of being a woman and a man: what makes calling S a woman apt, is that S is oppressed on sex-marked grounds; what makes calling S a man apt, is that S is privileged on sex-marked grounds.

Haslanger's ameliorative analysis is counterintuitive in that females who are not sex-marked for oppression, do not count as women. At least arguably, the Queen of England is not oppressed on sex-marked grounds and so, would not count as a woman on Haslanger's definition. And, similarly, all males who are not privileged would not count as men. This might suggest that Haslanger's analysis should be rejected in that it does not capture what language users have in mind when applying gender terms.

However, Haslanger argues that this is not a reason to reject the definitions, which she takes to be revisionary: they are not meant to capture our intuitive gender terms.

In response, Mikkola has argued that revisionary analyses of gender concepts, like Haslanger's, are both politically unhelpful and philosophically unnecessary. Note also that Haslanger's proposal is eliminativist: gender justice would eradicate gender, since it would abolish those sexist social structures responsible for sex-marked oppression and privilege. If sexist oppression were to cease, women and men would no longer exist although there would still be males and females.

Not all feminists endorse such an eliminativist view though. Stone holds that Haslanger does not leave any room for positively revaluing what it is to be a woman: since Haslanger defines woman in terms of subordination,.

But according to Stone this is not only undesirable — one should be able to challenge subordination without having to challenge one's status as a woman. Feminism faces the following worries among others :. Commonality problems : 1 There is no feature that all women cross-culturally and transhistorically share. He thus proposes that women make up a natural kind with a historical essence:. In short, one is not a woman due to shared surface properties with other women like occupying a subordinate social position.

Rather, one is a woman because one has the right history: one has undergone the ubiquitous ontogenetic process of gender socialization. More worryingly, trans women will count as men contrary to their self-identification. Both Bettcher and Jenkins consider the importance of gender self-identification. Rather than trans women having to defend their self-identifying claims, these claims should be taken at face value right from the start. In addition to her revisionary argument, Haslanger has suggested that her ameliorative analysis of woman may not be as revisionary as it first seems , Although successful in their reference fixing, ordinary language users do not always know precisely what they are talking about.

Although her gender terminology is not intuitive, this could simply be because oppressive ideologies mislead us about the meanings of our gender terms. Our everyday gender terminology might mean something utterly different from what we think it means; and we could be entirely ignorant of this. If this is so, Haslanger's gender terminology is not radically revisionist.

This would require showing that the gender terminology we in fact employ is Haslanger's proposed gender terminology. But discovering the grounds on which we apply everyday gender terms is extremely difficult precisely because they are applied in various and idiosyncratic ways Saul , Haslanger, then, needs to do more in order to show that her analysis is non-revisionary. Uniessentialism attempts to understand and articulate this.

However, Witt's work departs in important respects from the earlier so-called essentialist or gender realist positions discussed in Section 2: Witt does not posit some essential property of womanhood of the kind discussed above, which failed to take women's differences into account. Further, uniessentialism differs significantly from those position developed in response to the problem of how we should conceive of women's social kind. It is not about solving the standard dispute between gender nominalists and gender realists, or about articulating some supposedly shared property that binds women together and provides a theoretical ground for feminist political solidarity.

Rather, uniessentialism aims to make good the widely held belief that gender is constitutive of who we are. Uniessentialism is a sort of individual essentialism. Traditionally philosophers distinguish between kind and individual essentialisms: the former examines what binds members of a kind together and what do all members of some kind have in common qua members of that kind.

The latter asks: what makes an individual the individual it is. We can further distinguish two sorts of individual essentialisms: Kripkean identity essentialism and Aristotelian uniessentialism.

The former asks: what makes an individual that individual? The latter, however, asks a slightly different question: what explains the unity of individuals? What explains that an individual entity exists over and above the sum total of its constituent parts? The standard feminist debate over gender nominalism and gender realism has largely been about kind essentialism.

Being about individual essentialism, Witt's uniessentialism departs in an important way from the standard debate. From the two individual essentialisms, Witt endorses the Aristotelian one. On this view, certain functional essences have a unifying role: these essences are responsible for the fact that material parts constitute a new individual, rather than just a lump of stuff or a collection of particles. Witt's example is of a house: the essential house-functional property what the entity is for, what its purpose is unifies the different material parts of a house so that there is a house, and not just a collection of house-constituting particles a, 6.

Due to this, gender is a uniessential property of social individuals. It is important to clarify the notions of gender and social individuality that Witt employs. Second, Witt distinguishes persons those who possess self-consciousness , human beings those who are biologically human and social individuals those who occupy social positions synchronically and diachronically.

These ontological categories are not equivalent in that they possess different persistence and identity conditions. Social individuals are bound by social normativity, human beings by biological normativity.

Thus, being a social individual is not equivalent to being a human being. Further, Witt takes personhood to be defined in terms of intrinsic psychological states of self-awareness and self-consciousness. However, social individuality is defined in terms of the extrinsic feature of occupying a social position, which depends for its existence on a social world.

So, the two are not equivalent: personhood is essentially about intrinsic features and could exist without a social world, whereas social individuality is essentially about extrinsic features that could not exist without a social world.

Witt's gender essentialist argument crucially pertains to social individuals , not to persons or human beings: saying that persons or human beings are gendered would be a category mistake. But why is gender essential to social individuals? For Witt, social individuals are those who occupy positions in social reality.

However, qua social individuals, we occupy multiple social positions at once and over time: we can be women, mothers, immigrants, sisters, academics, wives, community organisers and team-sport coaches synchronically and diachronically.

Now, the issue for Witt is what unifies these positions so that a social individual is constituted. After all, a bundle of social position occupancies does not make for an individual just as a bundle of properties like being white , cube-shaped and sweet do not make for a sugar cube. For Witt, this unifying role is undertaken by gender being a woman or a man : it is.

The sets of norms can conflict: the norms of motherhood can and do conflict with the norms of being an academic philosopher. However, in order for this conflict to exist, the norms must be binding on a single social individual. Witt, then, asks: what explains the existence and unity of the social individual who is subject to conflicting social norms? The answer is gender.

Gender is not just a social role that unifies social individuals. Witt takes it to be the social role — as she puts it, it is the mega social role that unifies social agents. First, gender is a mega social role if it satisfies two conditions and Witt claims that it does : 1 if it provides the principle of synchronic and diachronic unity of social individuals, and 2 if it inflects and defines a broad range of other social roles.

Gender satisfies the first in usually being a life-long social position: a social individual persists just as long as their gendered social position persists. Further, Witt maintains, trans people are not counterexamples to this claim: transitioning entails that the old social individual has ceased to exist and a new one has come into being. And this is consistent with the same person persisting and undergoing social individual change via transitioning.

Gender satisfies the second condition too. It inflects other social roles, like being a parent or a professional. The expectations attached to these social roles differ depending on the agent's gender, since gender imposes different social norms to govern the execution of the further social roles. Now, gender — as opposed to some other social category, like race — is not just a mega social role; it is the unifying mega social role.

Cross-cultural and trans-historical considerations support this view. Witt claims that patriarchy is a social universal a, By contrast, racial categorisation varies historically and cross-culturally, and racial oppression is not a universal feature of human cultures. Thus, gender has a better claim to being the social role that is uniessential to social individuals. This account of gender essentialism not only explains social agents' connectedness to their gender, but it also provides a helpful way to conceive of women's agency — something that is central to feminist politics.

Linda Alcoff holds that feminism faces an identity crisis: the category of women is feminism's starting point, but various critiques about gender have fragmented the category and it is not clear how feminists should understand what it is to be a woman , chapter 5. Alcoff holds that there is an objective basis for distinguishing individuals on the grounds of actual or expected reproductive roles:.

Further, this differential relation to the possibility of reproduction is used as the basis for many cultural and social phenomena that position women and men: it can be. Reproduction, then, is an objective basis for distinguishing individuals that takes on a cultural dimension in that it positions women and men differently: depending on the kind of body one has, one's lived experience will differ.

And this fosters the construction of gendered social identities: one's role in reproduction helps configure how one is socially positioned and this conditions the development of specifically gendered social identities. But, with the benefit of hindsight. That is, her view avoids the implausible claim that sex is exclusively to do with nature and gender with culture.

Rather, the distinction on the basis of reproductive possibilities shapes and is shaped by the sorts of cultural and social phenomena like varieties of social segregation these possibilities gives rise to. For instance, technological interventions can alter sex differences illustrating that this is the case Alcoff , Women's specifically gendered social identities that are constituted by their context dependent positions, then, provide the starting point for feminist politics.

This entry first looked at feminist arguments against biological determinism and the claim that gender is socially constructed. Next, it examined feminist critiques of prevalent understandings of gender and sex, and the distinction itself. In response to these concerns, the final section looked at how a unified women's category could be articulated for feminist political purposes and illustrated at least two things.

First, that gender — or what it is to be a woman or a man — is still very much a live issue. Second, that feminists have not entirely given up the view that gender is about social factors and that it is in some sense distinct from biological sex.

The jury is still out on what the best, the most useful or even the correct definition of gender is. Beauvoir, Simone de feminist philosophy, approaches: intersections between analytic and continental philosophy feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on reproduction and the family feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on the self homosexuality identity politics speech acts.

I am very grateful to Tuukka Asplund, Jenny Saul, Alison Stone and Nancy Tuana for their extremely helpful and detailed comments when writing this entry. Gender as socially constructed 2. Women as a group 4. With this in mind, Haslanger specifies how she understands genders: S is a woman iff [by definition] S is systematically subordinated along some dimension economic, political, legal, social, etc. S is a man iff [by definition] S is systematically privileged along some dimension economic, political, legal, social, etc.

Stone holds that Haslanger does not leave any room for positively revaluing what it is to be a woman: since Haslanger defines woman in terms of subordination, any woman who challenges her subordinate status must by definition be challenging her status as a woman, even if she does not intend to … positive change to our gender norms would involve getting rid of the necessarily subordinate feminine gender.

Stone , But according to Stone this is not only undesirable — one should be able to challenge subordination without having to challenge one's status as a woman. In order to exemplify this relational property, an individual must be a reproduction of ancestral women, in which case she must have undergone the ontogenetic processes through which a historical gender system replicates women. Bach , In short, one is not a woman due to shared surface properties with other women like occupying a subordinate social position.

For Witt, this unifying role is undertaken by gender being a woman or a man : it is a pervasive and fundamental social position that unifies and determines all other social positions both synchronically and diachronically. It unifies them not physically, but by providing a principle of normative unity.

Alcoff holds that there is an objective basis for distinguishing individuals on the grounds of actual or expected reproductive roles: Women and men are differentiated by virtue of their different relationship of possibility to biological reproduction, with biological reproduction referring to conceiving, giving birth, and breast-feeding, involving one's body. Further, this differential relation to the possibility of reproduction is used as the basis for many cultural and social phenomena that position women and men: it can be the basis of a variety of social segregations, it can engender the development of differential forms of embodiment experienced throughout life, and it can generate a wide variety of affective responses, from pride, delight, shame, guilt, regret, or great relief from having successfully avoided reproduction.

Alcoff , Reproduction, then, is an objective basis for distinguishing individuals that takes on a cultural dimension in that it positions women and men differently: depending on the kind of body one has, one's lived experience will differ. But, with the benefit of hindsight we can see that maintaining a distinction between the objective category of sexed identity and the varied and culturally contingent practices of gender does not presume an absolute distinction of the old-fashioned sort between culture and a reified nature.

Alcoff , That is, her view avoids the implausible claim that sex is exclusively to do with nature and gender with culture. Conclusion This entry first looked at feminist arguments against biological determinism and the claim that gender is socially constructed. Bibliography Alcoff, L. Witt ed. Ayala, S. Antony, L. Kourany ed. Armstrong, D. Bach, T. Benhabib, S.

Bettcher, T. Power, R.